Governments have at their disposal many monetary tools to advertise nationwide safety, resembling sanctions, international reduction, foreign exchange, overseas finance and legislation blocking off money for foreign terrorism. This ebook examines using theses financial rules and addresses how top to degree their effectiveness.
Read or Download Economic Instruments of Security Policy: Influencing Choices of Leaders PDF
Similar economic policy books
This publication seems to be at principles of foundation in preferential buying and selling agreements and their turning out to be significance in alternate negotiations. The book's message is that ideas of beginning can act as robust obstacles to alternate and feature been intentionally used as such.
On tax day, April 15, 2010, thousands of american citizens took to the streets with symptoms hard reduce taxes at the richest one percentage. yet why? wealthy humans have lots of political impression. Why may they should publicly exhibit for reduce taxes-and why might a person who wasn't wealthy sign up for the protest on their behalf?
Students in the Hayekian-Austrian culture of classical liberalism have performed almost no paintings at the kinfolk as an financial and social establishment. furthermore, there's a actual paucity of scholarship at the position of the kinfolk inside of classical liberal and libertarian political philosophy. Hayek's glossy relatives bargains a classical liberal thought of the family members, taking Hayekian social concept because the major analytical framework.
Additional info for Economic Instruments of Security Policy: Influencing Choices of Leaders
PA R T I I The World In part I, we examined the immutable laws of human nature. What motivates economic man to act? Can we use our knowledge of the principles of economics to model the behavior of leaders in the real world? That is the question studied in part II of the book: how can we apply economic instruments to influence leaders to take a desired action. S. embargo on Cuba. S. sanctions. We then turn, in the succeeding chapters, to specific economic instruments that can be utilized by policy makers to influence behavior.
The dictator mitigates the risk of losing power if people remain convinced that the dictator will win in any conflict that challenges his power. If, however, those close to the dictator believe that a key member of the elite will successfully overthrow the dictator, then the loyalties of the elite will quickly shift. The salient question, then, is who will win in a threat to the dictator’s power? The dictator has a strong incentive to ensure that all remain convinced that he can defeat any challenges.
And the dictator’s decision must carry the day. Mancur Olson, another distinguished voice in the study of autocracy, launched his own scientific line of inquiry into the dynamics of dictatorship. He observes, in the opening of his seminal article contrasting dictatorship with forms of democracy, that monarchists may be right. With power centered on one person, an economy can thrive in the absence of democracy. To explain this observation, Olson proposes a new theory of dictatorship and democracy for how they affect economic development.