By Jeremy Black
This well timed e-book presents a normal review of serious energy politics and global order from 1500 to the current. Jeremy Black presents numerous old case-studies, each one of which throws mild on either the ability in query and the foreign approach of the interval, and the way it had built from the previous interval.
The element of departure for this publication is Paul Kennedy’s 1988 masterpiece, The upward thrust and Fall of the good Powers. That iconic booklet, with its enviable mastery of the resources and its skilful integration of political, army and financial historical past, was once a good luck while it seemed and has justifiably remained very important seeing that. Written throughout the chilly warfare, although, Kennedy’s research was once a great deal of its time in its attention of the good powers in ‘Western’ phrases, and its emphasis on economics. This publication brings jointly strategic stories, diplomacy, army background and geopolitics to reply to the various modern questions left open through Professor Kennedy's nice paintings, and likewise appears to the way forward for nice energy family and folks hegemony.
Great Powers and the hunt for Hegemony should be of significant curiosity to scholars of diplomacy, strategic stories and overseas history.
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Extra resources for Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order Since 1500
In contrast, the Ottomans are not generally criticized for strategic overreach, possibly because all their major conquests were contiguous in land-based terms and, therefore, to a navalist, ‘natural’ and not overreaching. Perhaps the paradigmatic case of strategic overreach in Western historiography involves Athens, a naval power, and its unsuccessful expedition to Syracuse during the Peleponnesian War (431–404 BC). Aside from the Turks, it is instructive to consider comparisons with the major Oriental states.
39 Chinese naval forces were usually not organizationally differentiated from the ground forces; thus, the term ‘navy’ is misleading, and ‘water forces’ may be a more appropriate designation. There was no imperial naval staff and no Admiral of China. This issue, however, can be approached from another direction than that of geopolitics by asking whether the true weakness of non-Western powers was that they were overly dependent on state direction and initiatives. The Western states can then be favourably contrasted by arguing that they contained more ‘space’ for semi-independent initiatives by autonomous groups.
In the long term, Ottoman limitations in the region helped ensure that the Indian Ocean became a zone of European naval and imperial activity. Indeed, the leading Islamic naval power in the region in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to be Oman, which operated as a vigorous regional power in the Arabian Sea and along the coast of East Africa, capturing the Portuguese bases of Muscat in 1650 and Fort Jesus at Mombasa in 1698 and retaining a presence based at Zanzibar until the late nineteenth century.